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Concerning Aesthetic Functionality and Still
Got Away with It in Au-Tomotive Gold
By Yevgeniy Markov *
I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

¶2

¶3

Aesthetic functionality, a doctrine that attempts to classify some “visually attractive
and aesthetically pleasing designs . . . as ‘functional’ and hence free for all to copy and
imitate,” 1 has faded over the course of the past three decades. 2 Even the Ninth Circuit,
which authored the opinion that led to the blossoming of the doctrine of aesthetic
functionality in Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., has “limited, if not rejected” the doctrine
in its subsequent decisions. 3 Indeed, the legal landscape has been shaped in such a way
during the preceding decade as to allow another circuit to openly flout the previously
revered Pagliero decision by reaching a different result in nearly identical
circumstances. 4
The “fading” theory of aesthetic functionality has, however, recently gained a
powerful new ally in the United States Supreme Court, which has attempted to “put some
life” into the doctrine 5 with its opinion in TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays,
Inc. 6 However, the TrafFix Devices decision has come under fire from some of the
leading commentators 7 for possibly misinterpreting the earlier holding of Qualitex Co. v.
Jacobson Products Co., Inc. 8 At the same time, the opinion in TrafFix Devices never
reached the issue of aesthetic functionality on the merits, but rather merely suggested its
application to other related cases. 9 Thus, it is possible that the entirety of the recent
Supreme Court case law relating to the doctrine of aesthetic functionality currently rests
upon an incorrect interpretation of the Qualitex decision supported by dicta.
Faced with such procedurally convoluted guidance from the Supreme Court, the
circuits have been forced to make a difficult choice. On one hand, a circuit court may
*

Northwestern University School of Law, Candidate for J.D., 2008.
J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 7.79 (4th ed.
2006).
2
See id. § 7.80.
3
See First Brands Corp. v. Fred Mayer, Inc., 809 F.2d 1378, 1382 (9th Cir. 1987).
4
See Villeroy & Boch Keramische Werke K.G. v. THC Sys., Inc., 999 F.2d 619 (2d Cir. 1993).
5
MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 7.80.
6
532 U.S. 23 (2001).
7
MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 7.80 (the statement that Qualitex dealt with aesthetic functionality is
amazing nd incomprehensible”).
8
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995).
9
See Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 457 F.3d 1062, 1071 (9th Cir. 2006).
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decide to treat TrafFix Devices as good law and follow the aesthetic functionality prong
suggested by its dicta. 10 On the other hand, a circuit court may declare that it will use its
existing case law instead of following TrafFix Devices until the Supreme Court decides
the issue of aesthetic functionality on its merits. Such was the precise dilemma
confronted by the Ninth Circuit in its recent decision of Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v.
Volkswagen of America, Inc. 11
In the opinion, the Ninth Circuit cited and
comprehensively discussed TrafFix Devices, ostensibly choosing to follow its treatment
of aesthetic functionality. 12 However, a more thorough analysis of the Au-Tomotive Gold
opinion reveals that it contains reasoning that is based not on the test established by the
Supreme Court in TrafFix Devices, but rather on the Ninth Circuit’s own pre–TrafFix
Devices case law.
II. FACTS OF THE CASE
¶4

Appellees, Volkswagen of America, Inc. and Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft
(Volkswagen) as well as Audi of America, Inc. and Audi Aktiengesellschaft (Audi), are
two well-known automobile manufacturers that also manufacture a plethora of parts and
accessories. Appellant, Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. (Auto Gold), produces and sells a
variety of accessories that “complement specific makes of cars.” 13 Auto Gold has sold
key chains, license plates, and license plate frames bearing insignia that indisputably
belong to Volkswagen and Audi, and is accused of selling these accessories bearing
distinctive Volkswagen and Audi trademarks without either of the latter companies’
permission. 14 While the Volkswagen-and Audi-related accessories sold by Auto Gold
came with disclaimers asserting that they were not products that were officially endorsed
by either of the two car manufacturers, these disclaimers were both invisible once the
product had been removed from its packaging and used and were also sometimes not
entirely clear, with the product label stating that “the product ‘may or may not’ not be
dealer approved.” 15 Following an unrelated lawsuit that resulted in Auto Gold being
prevented from selling goods bearing unauthorized trademarks of another car
manufacturer, 16 Auto Gold filed a lawsuit seeking declaratory judgment against
Volkswagen and Audi based on various claims in order to prevent the two car
manufacturers from seeking injunctive relief in a similar fashion, while Volkswagen and
Audi themselves filed counterclaims. 17 The district court entered a partial summary
judgment in favor of Auto Gold, ruling that Auto Gold’s unauthorized products bearing
Audi and Volkswagen insignia could not be considered trademark infringements and/or
trademark counterfeiting because they fell under the doctrine of aesthetic functionality.18
The district court was of the opinion that the logos used by Volkswagen and Audi “are
10

Id.
Id. at 1068.
12
Id. at 1070-72.
13
Id. at 1065.
14
Id.
15
Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 457 F.3d 1062, 1071 (9th Cir. 2006).
16
See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc., No. 96-384-CIV-J-20, 1996 WL 1609124, at
*1 M.D.Fla. June 19, 1996).
17
Au-Tomotive Gold, 457 F.3d at 1065-66.
18
Id. at 1066.
11
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used not because they signify that the license plate or key ring was manufactured or sold
. . . by Volkswagen or Audi, but because there is a[n] aesthetic quality to the marks that
purchasers are interested in having.” 19 Volkswagen and Audi timely appealed to the
Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit, asking for a reversal of this partial summary
judgment. 20 In its resulting opinion, the Ninth Circuit found itself wrestling with the
ever-changing definition of aesthetic functionality, its own wealth of case law precedent,
and the uncertain guidance given to it by the Supreme Court in several of its recent
decisions.
III. WHAT IS AESTHETIC FUNCTIONALITY?
¶5

¶6

¶7

The doctrine of aesthetic functionality apparently originates from a comment in the
1938 Restatement of Torts, 21 which states that “when goods are bought largely for their
aesthetic value, their features may be functional because they definitely contribute to that
value and thus aid the performance of an object for which the goods are intended.” 22
This definition had been used infrequently until the Ninth Circuit’s aforementioned
landmark decision in Pagliero v. Wallace China Co. 23
Pagliero stated that a functional feature is “an important ingredient in the
commercial success of the product,” as opposed to “a mere arbitrary embellishment . . .
primarily adopted for purposes of identification and individuality and hence, unrelated to
basic consumer demands.” 24 Under this test, the distinctive China patterns used by
Wallace China were deemed aesthetically functional because the attractiveness and eyeappeal of their design constituted the primary benefit that the company’s customers
sought when purchasing its china products. 25 This widely cited decision formed the basis
of the aesthetic functionality doctrine in several circuits for nearly three decades until the
Ninth Circuit itself dealt it a devastating, limiting blow in its subsequent decision of
Vuitton et Fils S.A. v. J. Young Enterprises, Inc. 26
In Vuitton, the counterfeiter of the famous Louis Vuitton handbags argued that its
use of the well-known Louis Vuitton insignia was aesthetically functional because the
insignia were “related to the reasons consumers purchase [the] product.” 27 Under the
Pagliero test, which involved the analysis of a product feature as “an important
ingredient in the commercial success of the product,” 28 the unauthorized use of the wellknown Louis Vuitton insignia should have been considered aesthetically functional and
thus “free for all to copy and imitate.” 29 However, this counterintuitive decision was
avoided by the Ninth Circuit in Vuitton, as the court specifically rejected the notion that
“any feature of a product which contributes to the consumer appeal and saleability of the
19

Id.
Id.
21
MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 7.79.
22
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 742 cmt. a (1938).
23
MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 7.80.
24
Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1952).
25
Id. at 343-44.
26
644 F.2d 769, 773 (9th Cir. 1981).
27
Id.
28
Pagliero, 198 F.2d at 343-44.
29
MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 7.80.
20
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product is, as a matter of law, a functional element of that product.” 30 Under the new
analysis of aesthetic functionality promulgated by Vuitton, “the mere fact that the mark is
the ‘benefit that the consumer wishes to purchase’ would not override protection if the
mark is ‘source-identifying.’” 31 Because the principal purpose of trademark law is to
ensure that consumers are able to identify the source of a product, 32 the Vuitton decision
dealt “a limiting but not a fatal blow” to the aesthetic functionality doctrine. 33
After Vuitton, aesthetic functionality significantly faded in the Ninth Circuit over a
period of several decades. 34 While the Ninth Circuit flirted with the doctrine
occasionally, providing sufficient material for some to declare that “the Pagliero teaching
is alive and well in the Ninth Circuit,” 35 by the end of the 1990s, a court could observe
that “the aesthetic functionality test is essentially defunct in [the Ninth] circuit.” 36
Another Ninth Circuit decision in Clicks Billiards, Inc. v. Sixshooters, Inc. flatly stated
that “[n]or has this circuit adopted the ‘aesthetic functionality’ theory, that is, the notion
that a purely aesthetic feature can be functional.” 37
While a handful of courts had previously relied on Pagliero to deny protection to a
large variety of product types, 38 even they gradually came to reject the aesthetic
functionality doctrine as it had been established via Pagliero by the late 1980s and early
1990s. 39 The Second Circuit, for example, had vacillated with regards to the doctrine of
aesthetic functionality for a number of years,40 relying on Pagliero to establish that a
design of a sofa was functional in one case, 41 and limiting functionality solely to
utilitarian features in another.42 The latest development in the aesthetic functionality
doctrine as it applies in the Second Circuit has been to adopt a standard of functionality
different from that in Pagliero by limiting the doctrine to purely ornamental features, 43 a
view similar to that held by the Third Restatement of Unfair Competition.44 As if
reaffirming its new anti-Pagliero stance, the Second Circuit decided a different case
bearing a remarkable factual similarity to Pagliero by finding the design of China
patterns to not be functional. 45 Thus, the aesthetic functionality doctrine survives in the
30

644 F.2d at 773.
Id. at 774.
32
See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995).
33
Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 457 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2006).
34
See MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 7.80.
35
Ralph S. Brown, Design Protection: An Overview, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1341, 1368 (1987).
36
MCCARTHY, supra note 1 (quoting Gucci Timepieces Am., Inc. v. Yidah Watch Co., 47 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1938 (C.D. Cal. 1998)).
37
Clicks Billiards, Inc. v. Sixshooters, Inc., 251 F.3d 1252, 1260 (9th Cir. 2001).
38
See MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 7.80.
39
See, e.g., PAF S.r.l. v. Lisa Lighting Co., 712 F.Supp. 394, 401 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (“Aesthetic
functionality has
been rejected in this circuit as a standard for determining functionality in trademark infringement
actions.”).
40
See MCCARTHY, supra note 1, at § 7.80.
41
See Industria Arredamenti Fratelli Saporiti v. Charles Craig, Ltd., 725 F.2d 18, 20 (2d Cir. 1984)
(citing Pagliero v. Wallace China Co, 198 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1952) to establish that “design on hotel china .
. . [is] aesthetically appealing . . . [and] an important ingredient in the saleability of the goods”).
42
See Warner Bros., Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 724 F.2d 327, 331 (2d Cir. 1983).
43
Wallace Int’l Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger Silver Art Co., 916 F.2d 76, 80 (2d Cir. 1990).
44
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17 cmt. c (1995).
45
See Villeroy & Boch Keramische Werke K.G. v. THC Sys., Inc., 999 F.2d 619 (2d Cir. 1993).
31
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Second Circuit, albeit in a very different manner from the Ninth Circuit’s original
treatment of the doctrine in Pagliero.
¶10
Surprisingly, the confusion in the circuits concerning the doctrine of aesthetic
functionality did not result in the Supreme Court “directly address[ing] aesthetic
functionality as a dispositive issue in a case” until at least 1995, 46 the year of its Qualitex
decision (of course, if one is to take the view held by some prominent commentators that
Qualitex never dealt with aesthetic functionality to begin with, 47 then the Supreme Court
cannot be said to have addressed the doctrine of aesthetic functionality dispositively to
this day). No doubt exists, however, that the Supreme Court has tried to put some life
into aesthetic functionality in recent years, its strongest attempt occurring in its
previously mentioned opinion in TrafFix Devices. 48
¶11
The question in TrafFix Devices was whether the dual-spring design of a road sign
could be considered “functional.” 49 In determining whether such a feature could have
been considered functional, the Supreme Court established a two-part test. Under the
first prong of the test, “utilitarian functionality,” 50 which was first established by the
Supreme Court in its earlier opinion Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories,
Inc. 51 where the Court wrote a feature is functional if “it is essential to the use or purpose
of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article.” 52 This is the prong of the
test that is to be reached by a court first, as, indeed, was the case in TrafFix Devices. 53
According to the Supreme Court, if and only if the utilitarian functionality of an article
failed to be established under that first utilitarian functionality prong, it would then be
proper for a court to utilize the aesthetic functionality prong of the test by asking, 54 in the
language of Qualitex, whether the “exclusive use of the feature would put competitors at
a significant non-reputation-related disadvantage.” 55
¶12
In establishing the second, aesthetic-functionality-based prong of its two-part test,
the Supreme Court did not merely imply that Qualitex dealt with the doctrine of aesthetic
functionality. On the contrary, Justice Kennedy, writing for a unanimous Court in
TrafFix Devices, went as far as stating that aesthetic functionality was the central
question in Qualitex, since “there [had been] no indication [in Qualitex] that the greengold color of the laundry press pad had any bearing on the use or purpose of the product
or its cost or quality.” 56 It is this view that aesthetic functionality had been the central
question in Qualitex that has come under fire from at least one prominent source. 57

46

MCCARTHY, supra note 1.
See MCCARTHY (the statement that Qualitex dealt with aesthetic functionality is “amazing and
incomprehensible”).
48
Id.
49
TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 26 (2001).
50
Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 457 F.3d 1062, 1071 (9th Cir. 2006).
51
Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844 (1982).
52
TrafFix Devices, 532 U.S. at 32 (quoting Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 165
(1995)).
53
Id. at 33.
54
Id.
55
Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 165.
56
TrafFix Devices, 532 U.S. at 33.
57
See, e.g., MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 7.80 (the statement that Qualitex dealt with aesthetic
functionality is “amazing and incomprehensible”).
47
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After establishing its two-pronged test in TrafFix Devices, the Supreme Court went
on to apply it to the facts of the case. Since the dual-spring design “provide[d] a unique
and useful mechanism to resist the force of the wind,” 58 the Court held it to be functional
under the first, utilitarian-functionality-related prong of the test established by Inwood
Laboratories. The issue as to whether the design fell under the second prong dealing
with the issue of aesthetic functionality was thus never reached by the Supreme Court in
the TrafFix Devices decision, prompting the Ninth Circuit in Au-Tomotive Gold to softly
call it a suggestion when referring to the aesthetic functionality prong of TrafFix
Devices. 59 Because the Supreme Court did not dispositively decide the issue of aesthetic
functionality and its application in TrafFix Devices, both the Court’s treatment of the
doctrine of aesthetic functionality as one of the two prongs of its two-part functionality
test and the Court’s bold statement that aesthetic functionality had been the central
question in Qualitex are merely dicta.
¶14
While the treatment of aesthetic functionality in TrafFix Devices clearly constitutes
a dictum, it is not at all clear that the issue had not, in fact, been decided dispositively
earlier in Qualitex. If the opinion of Justice Kennedy is, regardless of its status as a
dictum, correct in concluding that the doctrine of aesthetic functionality was the central
question in Qualitex, 60 then the Supreme Court has dispositively decided the issue of
aesthetic functionality on its merits. Indeed, the Supreme Court has not shied away from
dropping hints elsewhere that it considers Qualitex to have dispositively decided the
future of the aesthetic functionality doctrine. Justice Scalia, for instance, lends credence
to this view in the Supreme Court’s decision of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara
Brothers, Inc. by specifically citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Qualitex as authority
for his statement that “establish[ing] the nonfunctionality of the design feature . . . may
involve consideration of its esthetic appeal.” 61
¶15
Not all commentators agree, however, that Qualitex was a decision that dealt with
aesthetic functionality. For instance, J. Thomas McCarthy, in McCarthy on Trademarks
and Unfair Competition, calls the Supreme Court’s statement that the central question in
Qualitex was concerned with the doctrine of aesthetic functionality amazing and
incomprehensible, since the doctrine of aesthetic functionality had been mentioned in that
case only in three instances, two of which had been “quotations made in passing from the
Restatement.” 62 Mr. McCarthy is not alone in his critique of the Supreme Court’s
language in TrafFix Devices; indeed, Jerome Gilson, in Trademark Protection and
Practice, flatly states that the Supreme Court in TrafFix “was incorrect . . . to declare that
aesthetic functionality was the ‘central question’ in the Qualitex case. The central
question in Qualitex was whether color alone could serve as a valid trademark.” 63 Thus,
the question of whether Qualitex has dispositively decided the fate of the doctrine of
aesthetic functionality is not at all unambiguously clear, and it is perhaps with this in
mind that the Ninth Circuit decided to at least project a resemblance of following the
aesthetic-functionality-related prong of the test established in TrafFix Devices.
58

TrafFix Devices, 532 U.S. at 33.
Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 457 F.3d 1062, 1071 (9th Cir. 2006).
60
TrafFix Devices, 532 U.S. at 33.
61
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 214 (2000).
62
MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 7.80.
63
JEROME GILSON, GILSON ON TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 2A.04(5)(b) (2006).
59

202

Vol. 6:2]

¶16

Yevgeniy Markov

In summary, the state of the current Supreme Court precedent relating to aesthetic
functionality serves to befuddle both the reader of the Supreme Court’s opinions, and,
naturally, the circuits. It is difficult to understand where the law stands in-between what
may or may not be the dispositive treatment of the issue in Qualitex, the dicta and the
two-pronged test from TrafFix Devices, the vehement denial by several experts that
Qualitex concerns aesthetic functionality, and Justice Scalia’s cryptic remarks concerning
esthetic appeal made in Wal-Mart Stores. 64 It is clear from the unanimous opinion
written by Justice Kennedy in TrafFix Devices that the Court views aesthetic
functionality as having been dispositively decided by Qualitex, and as being an important
component of the functionality doctrine alongside the utilitarian functionality prong as it
had been established by Inwood Laboratories. If the current Supreme Court never again
attempts to reach aesthetic functionality in a dispositive case, however, the door may be
theoretically open for another Court in future years to demolish the weak Supreme Court
aesthetic functionality precedent by echoing the reasoning used by Gilson and McCarthy
in order to dismiss Qualitex while simultaneously refusing to follow both the text of the
TrafFix Devices opinion and language from Wal-Mart Stores as dicta. Thus, at least in
theory, the highest law concerning aesthetic functionality has not yet been effectively
settled. On the other hand, it is also very useful to note that there is nothing that prevents
the Supreme Court from burying the issue concerning the doctrine of aesthetic
functionality once and for all by granting certiorari to a case like the Ninth Circuit’s AuTomotive Gold opinion, to whose treatment of aesthetic functionality we presently turn.
IV. AESTEHTIC FUNCTIONALITY IN AU-TOMOTIVE GOLD

¶17

Perhaps due to the uncertainty within the Supreme Court’s case law concerning
aesthetic functionality, or perhaps for a different reason entirely, the Ninth Circuit
decided to at the very least appear to be following the two-pronged test outlined in
TrafFix Devices. 65 Indeed, the Au-Tomotive Gold opinion takes great pains to “quote
extensively from the passages [of TrafFix Devices] that set out the appropriate inquiry for
functionality,” 66 perhaps so that its understanding of the Supreme Court’s opinion in
TrafFix Devices may be readily apparent. Having concluded that the two-pronged test
should apply to its analysis, the Ninth Circuit then proceeds to mention the Inwood
Laboratories utilitarian functionality prong of the test as it may be applied to AuTomotive Gold. Noting that Auto Gold did not attempt to argue that its use of
Volkswagen and Audi logos could fall under the utilitarian functionality prong of the test
established by Inwood Laboratories, the Ninth Circuit nonetheless found it necessary to
dismiss such reasoning by stating that “Auto Gold’s products would still frame license
plates and hold keys just as well without the [Volkswagen and Audi] marks.” 67 While the
opinion did not directly state that this language concerned utilitarian functionality under
Inwood Laboratories, its probable function in the Au-Tomotive Gold opinion is to rebut a
possible argument that the Audi and Volkswagen trademarks were “essential to the use or
64

MCCARTHY, supra note 1.
Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volskwagen of Am., Inc., 457 F.3d 1062, 1072-73 (“[A]fter Qualitex and
TrafFix, the test for functionality proceeds in two steps.”).
66
Id. at 1071.
67
Id. at 1072-73.
65
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purpose of the article.” 68 It is entirely possible that the Ninth Circuit did not wish to
specifically link to the use or purpose language from Inwood Laboratories in order to
avoid a possible argument by Auto Gold that the quality of the Audi and Volkswagen
brand names was the purpose for which the consumers purchased Auto Gold’s products.
In any event, while the Ninth Circuit’s treatment of the use or purpose language is
somewhat muddy, the question of whether Auto Gold’s products could function just as
well without Volkswagen’s and Audi’s marks seems to be aimed at their “use.” As such,
even though the Ninth Circuit may have found itself to be taking liberties in its
application of the Inwood Laboratories prong of the TrafFix Devices test, there is little
doubt that its opinion set out to at least correctly follow the test’s parameters.
¶18
The same can be said of the Ninth Circuit’s statement that “[u]se of the marks does
not alter the cost structure or add to the quality of the products.” 69 This language
correctly echoes the “affects the cost or quality of the article” language in TrafFix
Devices. 70 Thus, while the Ninth Circuit’s overall treatment of the use or purpose
language from Inwood Laboratories is questionable, it does appear to ask the correct
questions in order to satisfy the utilitarian functionality prong in its analysis.
¶19
After establishing that Auto Gold’s usage of Volkswagen’s and Audi’s trademarks
does not fall under the utilitarian functionality prong of the two-part test from TrafFix
Devices, the Ninth Circuit reached the aesthetic functionality prong of the test. Prior to
its doing so, the Ninth Circuit once again took great pains upon itself to remind the reader
that it was following the test formulated in TrafFix Devices by stating that “[w]e next ask
whether Volkswagen and Audi’s marks . . . perform some function such that the
‘exclusive use of [the marks] would put competitors at a significant non-reputationrelated disadvantage.’” 71 Despite this commendable (and technically correct) start,
however, the Ninth Circuit never came back to the Supreme Court’s language in either
TrafFix Devices or Qualitex that required the resolution of the question as to whether
Auto Gold’s trademarks put competitors at a “significant non-reputation-related
disadvantage” again. 72 Instead, the Ninth Circuit went on to state that “[it] ha[s] squarely
rejected the notion that ‘any feature of a product which contributes to the consumer
appeal and saleability of the product is, as a matter of law, a functional element of that
product.’” 73 This language originates from (and, indeed, is directly cited from) the Ninth
Circuit’s own pre-Qualitex and pre-TrafFix Devices Pagliero-killing precedent
established in Vuitton. Moreover, such a statement is also clearly and unambiguously
incompatible with Qualitex or TrafFix Devices in any way, as it does not ask, as it should
have done, whether any competitors were put at a significant non-reputation-related
disadvantage as a result of Automotive Gold’s activities. To support its reasoning, the
Ninth Circuit generously cited decisions from its sister circuits, but neglected to inform
the reader that the oldest of these opinions comes from 1998, three full years before the
Supreme Court’s decision in TrafFix Devices first hinted that the opinion in Qualitex may

68

TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 26 (2001).
Au-Tomotive Gold, 457 F.3d at 1073.
70
TrafFix Devices, 532 U.S. at 35.
71
Au-Tomotive Gold, 457 F.3d at 1073 (quoting TrafFix Devices, 532 U.S. at 32).
72
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995).
73
Vuitton et Fils S.A. v. J. Young Enters., Inc., 644 F.2d 769, 773 (9th Cir. 1981), quoted in AuTomotive Gold, 457 F.3d at 1073.
69
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have presented the doctrine of aesthetic functionality as its central question. 74 Thus, the
numerous decisions adopted by the Ninth Circuit’s sister circuits cannot have possibly
been relevant to the Ninth Circuit’s Au-Tomotive Gold opinion, as they had all been
decided when the TrafFix Devices test relating to the doctrine of aesthetic functionality
did not even exist.
¶20
After inexplicably citing language from its own precedent of Vuitton in order for its
Au-Tomotive Gold opinion to satisfy the requirements of TrafFix Devices’ aesthetic
functionality prong, the Ninth Circuit explained that its caselaw has limited the doctrine
of aesthetic functionality to “product features that serve an aesthetic purpose wholly
independent of any source-identifying function.” 75 This reference, however, does little to
meet the requirements of either Qualitex or TrafFix Devices for several independent
reasons. First, the Ninth Circuit’s case law has “limited, if not rejected” 76 the theory of
aesthetic functionality, which certainly puts the circuit’s case law at odds with the
Supreme Court’s intent of reviving the doctrine, as evident in Qualitex, TrafFix Devices,
and Wal-Mart Stores. Second, this language still does not ask whether any competitors
were put at a “significant non-reputation-related disadvantage,” 77 a prong of the test that
was clearly and unambiguously noted as a requirement by the Supreme Court in such
cases via its opinion in TrafFix Devices. Finally, as if to inculcate the reader’s mind with
the notion that it considers the Qualitex decision to be binding precedent concerning the
doctrine of aesthetic functionality that it now believes to be following, the Ninth Circuit
cited Qualitex as being one of the cases where a “product feature[] that serve[d] an
aesthetic purpose wholly independent of any source identifying function” fell under the
umbrella of the aesthetic functionality doctrine. 78 However, no citation to Qualitex can
fix the fact that the Ninth Circuit did not follow either its language or the language
required under the aesthetic functionality test in TrafFix Devices.
¶21
Next, the Ninth Circuit presents us with the most devious portion of its opinion.
The claim advanced in its next argument is that “[a]ny disadvantage Auto Gold claims in
not being able to sell Volkswagen or Audi marked goods is tied to the reputation and
association with Volkswagen and Audi.” 79 At first glance, this language appears to
address the impact of exclusive use by Volkswagen and Audi of their trademarks on their
competitor, Auto Gold, in ruling that it is solely based on reputation, and thus to satisfy
the requirements of the aesthetic functionality prong of the two-part test established by
TrafFix Devices. However, the Ninth Circuit reached this conclusion by noting that the
“alleged aesthetic function is indistinguishable from and tied to the mark’s sourceidentifying nature.” 80 This conclusion is echoed by the Ninth Circuit’s previous
statement that “aesthetic functionality . . . has been limited to product features that serve
an aesthetic purpose wholly independent of any source-identifying function.” 81 Thus,
according to the Ninth Circuit, Auto Gold’s use of the trademarks is not protected (and is
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not put at a “significant non-reputation-related disadvantage”) 82 because it is solely tied
to the trademarks’ source-identifying nature. This, however, is but a restatement of the
Ninth Circuit’s old Vuitton test (“the mere fact that the mark is the 'benefit that the
consumer wishes to purchase' will not override protection if the mark is sourceidentifying”), 83 albeit colored with the Supreme Court’s language from TrafFix Devices.
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit’s use of the language that fits the test established within
TrafFix Devices and Qualitex is deceptive, as it is filled with the language used in its own
precedent established earlier within the Vuitton case. Instead of abandoning its own
precedent to heed the TrafFix Devices test, the Ninth Circuit thus followed the latter on
its surface only, while not as much as attempting to change its own treatment of aesthetic
functionality in any way whatsoever.
¶22
Finally, instead of noting that its decision, as it reflected upon the Supreme Court’s
reasoning in TrafFix Devices, placed another brick upon the evolutionary path of the
aesthetic functionality doctrine, the Ninth Circuit made a point to note that its decision
instead returned the doctrine “from whence it came” in the 1938 Restatement of Torts. 84
This would have been a surprising statement for the Ninth Circuit to make had it in fact
followed the precedent established by TrafFix Devices, as the 1938 Restatement of Torts
language does not inquire as to whether exclusive use of a feature places competitors at a
significant non-reputation-related disadvantage. 85 The 1938 Restatement of Torts does,
on the other hand, state that if a feature solely “associates goods with a particular source .
. . [then] it is non-functional,” 86 which echoes Vuitton’s refusal to override protection for
trademarks that are source-identifying — hardly the language that can be said to be
consistent with the Supreme Court’s precedent that the Ninth Circuit claimed to be
following throughout its opinion.
V. CONSEQUENCES OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT APPROACH
¶23

The Ninth Circuit has chosen neither of the two obvious paths in reaching its
conclusion in Au-Tomotive Gold. Neither has it wholeheartedly accepted the approach
advocated by Qualitex and TrafFix Devices, nor has it openly rejected it by relying on the
dictum status of TrafFix Devices and the uncertainty of the applicability of the aesthetic
functionality doctrine to Qualitex. Instead, the Ninth Circuit has purported to follow the
two-pronged test established under TrafFix Devices, but in reality refused to follow the
requirements of that test, choosing instead to continue with its own precedent established
by Vuitton.
¶24
It is possible that the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Au-Tomotive Gold was motivated
on one hand by the circuit’s reluctance to make changes to its long-standing precedent,
and on the other hand by its unwillingness to directly flaunt a recent Supreme Court
decision. This latter explanation of the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning certainly makes quite a
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bit of sense, especially considering the convoluted state of the Supreme Court’s case law
concerning the doctrine of aesthetic functionality.
Another possibility, however, is that the Au-Tomotive Gold opinion owes its
existence to strategic considerations. The alternative path that the Ninth Circuit could
have followed would be to not follow TrafFix Devices explicitly, thereby surely sending
a signal to the Supreme Court that the latter does not necessarily constitute a solid
precedent. This rebellious approach may very well have alerted the Supreme Court as to
the possible inadequacies in its aesthetic–functionality–related case law and quite
possibly could have resulted in the Supreme Court accepting certiorari for a case like AuTomotive Gold that it could then decide on the merits of aesthetic functionality. The
entirety of the procedural debate around Qualitex and TrafFix Devices would then have
been settled.
For all the obvious benefits of the Supreme Court finally developing unambiguous
case law concerning the doctrine of aesthetic functionality, however, it is highly unlikely
that such a decision would be rendered in such a way as to be consistent with the Ninth
Circuit’s post-Vuitton view of aesthetic functionality. The Court’s unanimous opinion in
TrafFix Devices that aesthetic functionality is not a “limited” doctrine,87 but rather an
important part of its two-step functionality test serves to indicate the rigidity of the
current Court’s opinion concerning aesthetic functionality that is not likely to change in
the foreseeable future. Justice Scalia’s previously mentioned comments from Wal-Mart
Stores only serve to put more credence in this notion. It is thus extremely unlikely, if not
downright impossible, that the Ninth Circuit could have received the result that it wanted
by following the approach of rejecting the TrafFix Devices and Qualitex decisions.
While the doctrine of aesthetic functionality remains in its current somewhat
unresolved state, however, the Ninth Circuit finds itself in a relatively comfortable
position. As it is plainly evident from its opinion in Au-Tomotive Gold, the Ninth Circuit
is currently free to use its pre-TrafFix Devices case law, albeit while being forced to
sprinkle and season it with TrafFix Devices language in order to make it look like an
opinion that properly utilizes the Supreme Court’s guidance concerning the doctrine of
aesthetic functionality, while at the same time keeping the aforementioned doctrine
“limited, if not rejected” within its jurisdictional borders.88 At the same time, by not
directly provoking the current Supreme Court into action, the Ninth Circuit has gained
the benefit of being able to avoid the issue’s settlement until a later time, when a different
make-up of the Supreme Court may perhaps be more sympathetic towards the Ninth
Circuit’s interpretation of the aesthetic functionality doctrine as it currently stands.
While it is highly unlikely that a make-up of the Supreme Court that would favor the
Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the doctrine of aesthetic functionality could manifest
itself at any point in the foreseeable future, especially given the unanimity of the current
Court’s TrafFix Devices opinion, it is possible that eventually the attitudes towards the
Qualitex decision expressed by Messrs. McCarthy and Gilson will come to prevail, and
the Ninth Circuit will then have its day.
Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit is by no means the only jurisdiction that has chosen
the approach of following its own case law despite the contrary guidelines established by
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TrafFix Devices while at the same time striving to appear to recognize the latter as good
law. In Valu Engineering, Inc. v. Rexnord Corp., the Federal Circuit discussed the
guidelines established by TrafFix Devices and Qualitex at length. 89 However, it ruled
that the TrafFix Devices test did not change its own well-established precedent that,
among other things, considered the availability of other alternatives to establish
functionality. 90 Instead, the Federal Circuit reasoned that the TrafFix Devices test
establishes solely that once a product feature has been found to be functional based on
other considerations, such as its ability to affect the cost or quality of a device, there is no
longer a need for a court to “consider the availability of alternative designs.” 91 This part
of the Federal Circuit’s opinion concerns the utilitarian functionality factors established
by Inwood Laboratories and is therefore not surprising since it echoes the Supreme
Court’s own reasoning in TrafFix Devices. The Federal Circuit, however, proceeded to
conclude that the Supreme Court’s analysis under TrafFix Devices did not establish that
“the availability of alternative designs cannot be a legitimate source of evidence to
determine whether a feature is functional in the first place.” 92 If the Federal Circuit truly
accepted the Supreme Court’s ruling and analysis under TrafFix Devices, as it fervently
claims that it did, then this analysis is obviously erroneous, since it entirely fails to
establish, or even mention, whether “exclusive use of the feature would put competitors
at a significant non-reputation-related disadvantage.” 93 It is also significant that, in order
to strengthen its own interpretation of TrafFix Devices, the Federal Circuit cited at length
to none other than Mr. J. Thomas McCarthy’s scathing attack on the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of Qualitex in order to establish that the language in TrafFix Devices “does
not render the Board's use of the Morton-Norwich factors erroneous.” 94 It follows,
therefore, that in Valu Engineering the Federal Circuit chose to tread the same path as the
one already taken by the Ninth Circuit: accept TrafFix Devices and Qualitex as good law
and binding Supreme Court precedent, discuss the two cases at length within its own case
law, but ultimately follow its jurisdiction’s own precedent when deciding cases dealing
with the thorny issue of aesthetic functionality.
¶29
If it is in fact true that the Ninth Circuit and the Federal Circuit followed their own
path in interpreting Qualitex and TrafFix Devices while also pursuing their own strategic
considerations, then it will only be possible for them to succeed if their actions are
inconspicuous enough to not alert the attention of the Supreme Court. Whether these
tactics turn out to be successful remains to be seen, but the Au-Tomotive Gold decision
has certainly not helped the raging debate concerning aesthetic functionality, and it is
useful to the members of the legal profession to note that this decision has by no means
settled the issue, in the Ninth Circuit or otherwise.
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VI. THE CORRECT APPROACH TO AESTHETIC FUNCTIONALITY
¶30

It is the humble opinion of this author that the evolution of the doctrine of
aesthetic functionality has been a positive development in trademark law. The now
antiquated treatment of the doctrine under Pagliero did not fully serve the objectives of
trademark law, since, when interpreted strictly, it could have potentially forced courts to
reach obviously incorrect decisions under certain scenarios. One excellent example of
just such a scenario is the previously discussed Vuitton case — if a court were to apply
the Ninth Circuit’s precedent that was established within Pagliero and that required a
functional feature to be “an important ingredient in the commercial success of the
product” to the fact pattern in Vuitton, 95 there is very little doubt that the case would have
been decided in favor of the counterfeiter of the Louis Vuitton handbags — hardly an
intuitively correct result from any standpoint, and definitely not a decision that any
manufacturer of “name-brand” products would have been comfortable with. It is indeed
true that, when taken to its logical extreme, the Pagliero treatment of the doctrine of
aesthetic functionality could have served to deny trademark protection to just about any
“quality” mark, including the Volkswagen and Audi insignia that constituted a central
factual issue in Au-Tomotive Gold.
¶31
On the other side of Pagliero, however, are cases like Kellogg Co. v. National
Biscuit Co., the facts of which were concerned with a manufacturer of shredded wheat
biscuits who purportedly attempted to monopolize their “pillow” design. 96 There seems
to be no reasonable justification that should allow trademark law to restrict the design of
the “pillow” biscuit to only one manufacturer; indeed, a legal system allowing such a
counterintuitive outcome would be structured in such a way as to poorly serve either of
the goals of trademark law as they are described in Qualitex: neither would it encourage
the production of quality products, nor would it discourage counterfeiters from making
fake copies of such products.
¶32
The facts of the Qualitex decision itself provide us with an important question to
which trademark law has to somehow find an appropriate answer. In Qualitex, the
factual question at issue concerned the possible functionality of the special “green gold”
colors with which the Qualitex Company had colored its cleaning press pads. 97 While the
Supreme Court found the color combination to not be functional, one must struggle in
order to declare color patterns to unambiguously and conclusively fall within the reach of
the “utilitarian functionality” doctrine. Indeed, under the language of the test established
by Inwood Laboratories, a manufacturer’s usage of one color pattern as opposed to
another can hardly be said to be “essential to the use or purpose of the article or . . . [to]
affect[] the cost or quality of the article.” 98 At the same time, however, a distinctive color
pattern may very well be “source-identifying” (as it probably was in Qualitex), and thus
afforded protection under the Ninth Circuit’s test established in Vuitton. 99 Ruling,
however, that certain color patterns should be protected under the trademark laws is once
again counterintuitive, for reasons dealing with both common sense and overall market
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efficiency (would anyone really want only a single tailor to make a specific suit color?)
and because doing so would rob the consumers of important choices, while causing great
pains both for foreign manufacturers attempting to import their products into the United
States and for domestic manufacturers attempting to export their products to other
nations. Moreover, such a ruling would impose prohibitive administrative costs upon
courts and juries, which would subsequently be forced to decide cases turning upon the
factual issue of whether a dark-dark red color pattern can be said to be closer to the darkdark-dark red pattern that had been protected under the trademark law or to the normal
red color which had not been so protected.
¶33
The Supreme Court’s analysis in TrafFix Devices effectively solves the dilemma
surrounding the doctrine of aesthetic functionality by correctly placing the emphasis upon
the crux of the issue: if a design feature is such that it would put the company’s
competitors at a “significant non-reputation-related disadvantage”, 100 then it is
automatically considered to fall under the aesthetic functionality doctrine and will
therefore not be protected by the copyright laws. Under this legal regime, no single
manufacturer has the ability to usurp a color or a shape that, while not being functional in
the utilitarian sense, could still provide consumers with a meaningful choice or to put
competitors at a disadvantage by requiring them to make dark-dark-dark red products
instead of simply dark-red ones and shaping their pillows as hexagons instead of
manufacturing them in the familiar rectangular shape. With the approach taken by the
Supreme Court in TrafFix Devices and Qualitex, the line between functionality and
trademark protection seems to finally have been drawn at the right place, even if,
perhaps, the procedural aspects of these two decisions remain somewhat muddy to this
day, as the Ninth Circuit’s Au-Tomotive Gold opinion readily attests. As such, the Ninth
Circuit’s opinion in Au-Tomotive Gold can only be criticized, not only for using
questionable methodology in order to shirk the possibly binding analysis used by the
Supreme Court in its previous case law, but also for continuing to follow its own
misguided precedent at the expense of reaching both the most efficient and overall the
best possible result.
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